Stick to Foreign Policy

Nicholas Kristof has written an editorial demonstrating, with scientific precision, why New York Times writers should just not write about science. Actually, I would tell the paper to just stop trying to write on science altogether, and that there is no good reason for them to, but their science page can sometimes have impressive photos of other galaxies and things...

Let's start here:

Genes that promote spirituality may do so in part by stimulating chemical messengers in the brain like dopamine, which can make people optimistic and sociable - and perhaps more likely to have children.

The sentence that follows it, however should really be read in the original print so that the full impact of its absurdity can be appreciated:

(Dopamine is very complex, but it appears linked to both spirituality and promiscuity, possibly explaining some church scandals.)

Let's forget the fact that priests, and nuns, swear an eternal marriage to God, and have no sexual outlets. Like maybe that explains it a little more easily.

Anyway, the suggestion of the article, it seems, is that spirituality may be genetically determined.

One bit of evidence supporting a genetic basis for spirituality is that twins
separated at birth tend to have similar levels of spirituality, despite
their
different upbringings. And identical twins, who have the same DNA, are
about
twice as likely to share similar levels of spirituality as fraternal
twins.

Let me just give a quick version of my take on theories which assert the genetic determination of high-order social and psychological phenomena, and while it may be too ambitious for a simple blog entry, take it or leave it as it is.

Genes code for simple things. In particular, every gene codes for a specific protein which, when the gene is activated, is constructed in accordance

with the rules in the genetic code. This is true for every gene, no matter

what it codes for, no matter how complicated. Proteins have differing

target effects, and whatever their general effect on behavior is ascertained to

be, we ascribe that as the "function" of the gene. The key thing that must be

realized is that the things for which the manufactured protein has the most

direct effect, are the things for which we can say with most confidence that the

gene is "coding" for something. This is a simple matter of what we mean by

coding.

In popular parlance, it is said that such and such is a "gene

for autism" or a "gene for obesity." This is convenient usage, but it must not

be forgotten that what is really happening is that genes are coding for

proteins, which then have whatever effects they are going to have in the body.

It would be more correct to say that this gene codes for a protein which plays

as a factor in this bodily state. This may seem overly picky and unecessary,

when refering to things for which the route from the protein to the final bodily

effect observed is direct, such as simple physical traits. In many of these

cases, there can be isolated a single protein, and hence a single gene,

responsible for the observed phenomenon. For instance, blue eyes are the result

of a single pigment, whose production is moderated by a single gene (this result

is ficitious, but is provided for illustration). However, it is absolutely

essential to remember when dealing with complex and multifactorial traits the

true meaning of the process being refered to when one talks about this or that

gene.

Consider the factors that go into the creation of a complex

psychological and sociological phenomenon like spirituality. An astute response

to this challenge may be that the question is too broad, and that it only can be

answered in any partially satisfactory manner if some level of description is

specified. So consider the factors that go into the creation of this phenomenon

at the psychological or sociological level, the level most immediate to the

phenomenon of spirituality itself. For one, a person becomes spiritual if there

is a certain need in the person's life which can be fulfilled by spiritual

activity. A person may be seeking answers to large questions, may be seeking

comfort in some way, or may have the unfulfilled need for larger human

connections, all of which can be satisfied by spiritual life. Another factor is

the liking of the person for the spiritual experience in its worldly

incarnation. The person who is turned off by gatherings of large groups of

people which last for relatively long periods of time will tend not to gravitate

to going to church, and this may in turn influence their feelings towards

spirituality. Psychologically, you have many discrete, individually unrelated

factors which contribute to the making of spirituality. A person's ability for

abstract thought can predispose him to be able to understand the kind of

thinking that goes on in spiritual contexts, and conversely, a person who is not

able to grasp abstract thought can feel alienated from spiritual discourse, or

like it all appears meaningless so why bother. A person's sociability can

determine how willing he is to engage with large communities, which is a

prominent aspect of religious experience. Then on top of those you have social

factors, such as how able one is to get any of the aforementioned factors

fulfilled by activities other than religion. The need for meaning can be

fulfilled by finding an interesting field of study and engaging in that. The

need for social connection can be fulfilled by the presence of a close group of

good friends. If person finds fulfillment for a need via other outlets, that is

one less factor available to contribute to the development of spirituality.

In relating these first-order social and psychological factors, which

obviously are quite numerous by themselves, to the concept of the gene, the

chain of factors has to be continued into more and more basic levels of analysis

and causation. Hence, any given complex psychological factor such as, say,

sociability, can be reduced to its own set of more basic psychological factors,

such as disposition, extroversion, mood, conformism, etc. At some point,

presumably there is a threshold at which immaterial things such as psychological

and social considerations can begin to be reduced and attributed to material

things. Mood is reduced to the presence of certain neurotransmitters, activity

in certain parts of the brain, the presence of proper nutrient and energy

levels, the existence of certain hormones in the blood. The entire point of this

is to establish the role of causation of the genes. The chain continues for as

many levels as are necessary until the level of the encoded protein and its

function is reached, at which point it can be said meaningfully that a

particular gene takes is a factor.

The point is that for each additional

level in the chain of factors that can be attributed to a particular trait, the

causation becomes more indirect and more multifactorial, spread thinner over

more factors. For each additional level, the contribution of any given more

basic factor is less and less. This is not to say that all genes are not

determinative of behaviors. In theory, some may be. It is to say that, even though

they may be determinative in the development of certain behaviors or traits,

their determinative influence becomes increasingly indirect and manifold.

There is a certain philosophical issue that becomes relevant here. The

postulation of free will, depending on at which level of causation it is

posited, becomes a large and perhaps fatally complicating factor. Say that the

causal chain of factors, from protein up to prayer, is interupted by the fact

that so and so specifically wants to become a religious person. Maybe

it became a goal because that person read about a scientific study in which

religious people are purported to live longer and be healthier. There is no way

of accounting for this action, by the very definition of free will! It occured

independently of any kind of material cause. In fact, free will seems to mean

that it occured independently of any conceivable law. Therefore if you believe

in free will, it's hard to see that you should believe in genetic determinism

for any other than the most basic traits.

It should be obvious what therelation of this all to religion is. Religion is one of the most complex, higher-order things that exist. It's one of the most difficult things to relate directly to genetics. So, there comes a point when it's meaningless to say something is genetically caused.

However, this doesn't prevent it from making for a fascinating and important and

inspirational-sounding editorial... "It turns out that our DNA may predispose humans

toward religious faith" is a fascinating, but ultimately empty statement. Like

saying that DNA may predispose us to ride bicycles, or DNA predisposes us to

have friends. Of course DNA predisposes us to these things! In a sense, DNA predisposes us to do everything we do. But the farther away that thing is in causation from the actual activity of DNA, which is, basically encoding proteins, the less meaningful the statement becomes.